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1.
It is important, within the jurisdiction of the contemporary State, to investigate 
the possibility of jurisdictional control of legislation under the treaties or in­
ternational conventions on human rights. It is clear that such investigation re­
quires previous analyses of the normative status of the treaties on human rights 
inside the Brazilian juridical order. If the international law of human rights is 
equated with ordinary law, obviously there is no possibility to raise it to the pa­
rameter level for judicial review. Notwithstanding, especially after the decision 
taken by the Brazilian Supreme Court in Extraordinary Appeal No. 466.3432, 
in which the legitimacy of civil imprisonment for unfaithful trustees was dis­
cussed confronting the International Pact of Human and Political Rights and 
the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San Jose), it is important 
to consider two positions that raise international law on human rights onto 
a higher level, providing it with the condition of a law that authorizes the legiti­
macy control of ordinary legislation. The position that gained majority at the
1 I am grateful to Luiz Henrique Krassuski Fortes, LL.M candidate under my supervision at
Federal University of Parana’s Law School, for reviewing and helping with the translation of 
this paper into English.
2 “Civil Arrest. Deposit. Unfaithful trustee. Chattel mortgage. Declaration of coercive measure.
Absolute inadmissibility. Insubsistence of constitutional provision and subordinate norms. In­
terpretation of article 5,, LXVII, and 1st, 2nd e 3rd paragraphs of the Federal Constitution, in the 
light of article 7, 7 th paragraph, of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San 
Jose of Costa Rica). Appeal not granted. Joint judgment of Extraordinary Appeal No. 349.703 
and Habeas Corpus No. 87.585 and No. 92.566. It is illicit the civil arrest of unfaithful 
trustee, regardless of the sort of deposit”. (extraordinary Appeal No. 466.343, Plenary, Min. 
Cezar Peluso, DJe 05.06.09, available in Portuguese at Supreme Court’s website: www.redir. 
stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=AC&docID=595444).
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trial of the Extraordinary Appeal, led by Justice3 Gilmar Mendes, attributed to 
the international treaties on human rights a supralegal normative status, while 
the position led by Justice Celso de Mello gave them constitutional stature. 
Alongside these positions, also worthy of note the position that sustains the 
supraconstitutionality of these international treaties4.
Attribute to the international treaties on human rights the status of ordi­
nary legislation not only authorize the signatory State to unilaterally disobey 
international agreements but also confronts the concept of a Cooperative 
Constitutional State, making the safeguard of human rights impossible on 
a supranational level. Moreover, the Brazilian Constitution itself makes it 
clear the superiority of the international treaties over the infraconstitutional 
legislation. According to the Constitution “the Federative Republic of Brazil 
will seek the economic, political, social and cultural integration of the Latin 
American peoples, aimed at the formation of a Latin-American community 
of nations” (article 4, sole paragraph); “the rights and interests expressed in 
this Constitution do not exclude others from this regime and from principles 
by it adopted, or the international treaties in which the Federative Republic of 
Brazil take part” (article 5, 2nd paragraph); “the international treaties and con­
ventions on human rights of which are approved, in each National Congress 
House, in two sessions, by three fifths of their respective members' votes, will 
be equivalent to the constitutional amendments” (article 5, 3rd paragraph); 
and “Brazil submits to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
whose creation it has manifested adhesion to” (article 5, 4th paragraph). Thus, 
the Constitution itself stresses the dignity of the international treaties on 
human rights, recognizing its prevalence over ordinary law. It must be noted 
that the 3rd paragraph of article 5 -  just like its 4th paragraph -  was inserted 
by the constitutional amendment No. 45 (2004), keeping it clear that the at­
tribution of the quality of constitutional amendment to the treaties requires 
approval “in each National Congress House, in two sessions, by three fifths 
of their respective members' votes”. In such a way that the Constitution itself 
provided the specific condition for the international treaties on human rights 
to assume the stature of constitutional norm.
3 Brazilian Supreme Court’s judges are denominated Ministros (“Ministers”) according to Brazil­
ian law. In order to favor comprehension, in this article they are referred as Justices , like their 
counterparts of the United States Supreme Court.
4 See: N. Pedro Sagues, El “con tro ld e  con ven ciona lidad"com o in strum en topara  la elaboracion d e  un
ius com m une interam ericano. In: A. Von Bogdandy, E. F. Mac-Gregor, M. M. Antoniazzi, (Co­
ord.), La Ju stic ia  C onstitu ciona ly su in ternacionalizacion, Hacia un ius con titu tiona le com m une 
en America Latina, Tomo 2, p. 449 e ss.
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Nevertheless, it was argued, within the trial of the referred Extraordinary 
Appeal No. 466.343, that international treaties on human rights would have 
constitutional status, despite having been approved before the constitutional 
amendment No. 45 (2004). Justice Celso de Mello concluded, in his opin­
ion, that the international conventions on human rights, incorporated into 
Brazilian law before the enactment of the constitutional amendment No. 45 
(2004), like the Pact of San Jose of Costa Rica, are invested with a materially 
constitutional nature, composing, under such a perspective, the conceptual 
notion of con stitu tiona lity block. The thesis of treaties’ constitutionality is 
based on the 2nd paragraph of article 5 of the Constitution. The logic is that 
this norm incorporates the rights established in the international treaties on 
human rights ratified by the country. Affirming that the rights and interests 
expressed in the Constitution do not exclude the rights established by inter­
national treaties to which Brazil has taken part, the 2nd paragraph would con­
fer the status of constitutional norm to them. The 2nd paragraph, thus, would 
be an open clause, admitting the incorporation of international treaties on 
human rights at the same hierarchical condition of the constitutional norms 
and not with another normative status5.
However, the thesis that prevailed in the trial of the Extraordinary Appeal 
No. 466.343, as previously mentioned, was that of the supralegality of the 
international law on human rights. The holding of the Court, in summary, is 
that the reference, on behalf of the Constitution, to international treaties on 
human rights, despite not being casual nor neutral from a juridical-normative 
point of view, did not attributed to these treaties the hierarchy of constitu­
tional norm. Justice Gilmar Mendes, in his opinion, noted that the thesis of 
supralegality “advocates in favor of the argument that the treaties on human 
rights would be infraconstitutional, however, due to their special character 
in relation to other international normative acts, they would also bear a su­
pralegal attribute. In other words, the treaties on human rights would not be 
able to confront the supremacy of the Constitution, but would have a special 
place reserved in the juridical order. To equate them to the ordinary legisla­
tion would be to underestimate its special value in the context of the system 
of protection of human rights”6.
5 See: A. A. Can^ado Trindade, Tratado d e  d ireito in terna ciona l dos d ireitos humanos, v. 1, Porto
Alegre 2003.
6 In portuguese: “pugna pelo argumento de que os tratados sobre direitos humanos seriam infra-
constitucionais, porem, diante de seu carater especial em rela^ao aos demais atos normativos 
internacionais, tambem seriam dotados de um atributo de supralegalidade. Em outros termos, 
os tratados sobre direitos humanos nao poderiam afrontar a supremacia da Constitui^ao, mas 
teriam lugar especial reservado no ordenamento jurfdico. Equipara-los a legisla^ao ordina- 
ria seria subestimar o seu valor especial no contexto do sistema de prote^ao dos direitos da
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In this regard, the international treaties on human rights approved in con­
formity with the dictates of the 3rd paragraph of article 5 of the Federal Con­
stitution are equivalent to the constitutional amendments; the other inter­
national treaties on human rights subscribed by Brazil constitute supralegal 
law; and the international treaties that do not deal with human rights have 
legal value.
2 .
International treaties, when qualified as supralegal law, are obviously set on 
a degree of normative hierarchy superior to that of the infraconstitutional 
legislation, yet inferior to the Constitution. The holding of the Extraordi­
nary Appeal No. 466.343, by recognizing the illegitimacy of the infracon­
stitutional legislation that regulates civil imprisonment of unfaithful trustees 
confronted with the International Pact of Civil and Political Rights and the 
American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San Jose of Costa Rica), 
stressed that, because the unequivocal special character of the international 
treaties that ensure the protection of human rights, it is not difficult to un­
derstand that the incorporation to the internal juridical order, through the 
ratification procedure provided by the Constitution, has the power to para­
lyze the efficacy of every conflicting normative infraconstitutional discipline7.
Note that the infraconstitutional legislation, in order to produce effect, 
must not only be in consonance with the Federal Constitution, but also with 
the international treaties on human rights. Thus, there are two control’s pa­
rameters and two validation programs for the ordinary legislation. In addi­
tion to the Constitution, the supralegal law is to condition and control the 
validity of the legislation.
Accordingly, this means that the legislation is submitted to new material 
limits, placed in the human rights encompassed in the international trea­
ties, which reveals that the contemporary State -  which relates collaboratively 
with other constitutional States inserted in a community, has the ability to 
control the legitimacy of the legislation confronted with human rights pro­
tected in the country and in the Latin-American community.
pessoa humana” (STF, Extraordinary Appeal No. 466.343, Plenary, Min. Cezar Peluso, DJe 
05.06.09).
7 See: Justice Gilmar Mendes opinion in the Extraordinary Appeal No. 466.343.
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3.
The control of legislation’s compatibility with international treaties on hu­
man rights may be done through d ir e c t  unconstitu tionality suit8, before the 
Brazilian Supreme Court, when the treaty was approved according to the 3rd 
paragraph of article 5 of the Federal Constitution. Obviously, these treaties 
also authorize the diffuse and concrete ju d ic ia l  review .
In the current Brazilian normative system, treaties that hold normative 
supralegal status only create opportunity to the diffuse control. The compati­
bility control of internal legislation with the conventional norms is a national 
judge’s duty , either by request of the interested party or by its own motion. 
Keep in mind, in this sense, the decision given by the Inter-American Court 
in the D ism issed Congressional Employees (Aguado—Alfaro et al.) v. P eru  case: 
“When a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Con­
vention, the judges are also subject to it; this obliges them to ensure that the 
effet util of the Convention is not reduced or annulled by the application 
of laws contrary to its provisions, object and purpose. In other words, the 
organs of the Judiciary should exercise not only a control of constitutional­
ity, but also of “conventionality” ex officio between domestic norms and the 
American Convention; evidently in the context of their respective spheres 
of competence and the corresponding procedural regulations. This function 
should not be limited exclusively to the statements or actions of the plaintiffs 
in each specific case, although neither does it imply that this control must 
always be exercised, without considering other procedural and substantive 
criteria regarding the admissibility and legitimacy of these types of action”9.
8 As explained by Supreme Court Justice, Gilmar Mendes, “the Brazilian system of judicial re­
view combines features from both abstract review and concrete review systems. As in the 
American concrete review system, Brazilian judges are conferred ample powers to analyze the 
constitutionality of governmental acts, allowing any judge or court to declare that a law or 
regulatory act is unconstitutional and, just as in the European abstract system, the Brazilian 
Constitutional model concentrates at the Supreme Court the competence to prosecute and 
adjudicate independent actions concerning the constitutionality “in abstract” of a law. In this 
way, the Brazilian system of Judicial Review displays original and diverse procedural instru­
ments for both verifying the constitutionality of legislation and protecting fundamental rights. 
These include the habeas corpus, habeas data, writ of mandamus, injunctive writ, public civil 
action and popular action. This diversity, so typical of the diffuse model, is complemented by 
a variety of instruments enabling the Supreme Court to exercise abstract review such as direct 
unconstitutionality suits, declaratory actions of constitutionality, direct unconstitutionality 
suits due to omission (ADO) and claims for non-compliance of a fundamental precept”. See: 
Framework of the Brazilian Judiciary and Judicial Review, available at www.stf.jus.br/reposi- 
torio/cms/portalStfInternacional/portalStfAgenda_pt_br/anexo/Framework_of_the_Brazil- 
ian_Judiciary Inglaterra_Final.10.20091.pdf.
9 I/A Court H.R., Case of the Dism issed Congressional Employees (Aguado—Alfaro e t  al.) v. Peru.
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An interesting question concerns the opportunity of the Brazilian Su­
preme Court to carry out diffuse control confronting supralegal law through 
Extraordinary Appeal. For it may be argued, initially, that a treaty does not 
constitute a constitutional norm and, therefore, violation of the supralegal 
law does not create opportunity to bringing an Extraordinary Appeal (based 
on article 102 of the Constitution). It is obvious that a treaty is not mistaken 
for a constitutional norm, in spite of being able to assume that status when 
approved through the qualified quorum  of 3rd paragraph to the article 5 of 
the Federal Constitution. Thus, certainly does not equate, in the quality of 
supralegal law, to the federal law, whose claim of violation opens opportunity 
to the Special Appeal before Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (article 105 
of the Constitution). It is important to remind, though, that the Supreme 
Court admitted and ruled the Extraordinary Appeal in which was alleged the 
violation of law recognized as supralegal exactly when it faced the matter of 
legitimacy of civil imprisonment of unfaithful trustees. (Extraordinary Ap­
peal No.466.343).
4.
There are those who sustain the supraconstitutionality of the Convention, 
i.e. the invalidity of the constitutional norm that conflicts with the Conven­
tion. It is claimed, as seen before, that the Convention could “paralyze”10 
the efficacy of infraconstitutional norms that are in conflict with it. One 
should remember that in the Extraordinary Appeal No. 466.343 trial it was 
decided that the constitutional provision of civil imprisonment for unfaith­
ful trustees (article 5, LXVIII), due the supremacy of the Constitution over 
international normative acts, could not be repealed by the adhesion of Brazil 
to the International Pact of Civil and Political Rights (article 11) and to the 
American Convention on Human Rights -  Pact of San Jose (article 7, 7), 
having ceased “to have applicability due the para lyz in g e ffe c t  of these treaties 
in relation to the infraconstitutional legislation that dictate the matter”11. 
However, it would be possible to argue that when the norm needs to be con­
trolled by Convention, it has already been through the filter of constitution­
ality control, in a way that the conventionality control implies the denial of 
constitutionality control. In fact, this problem -  supraconstitutionality of the
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2006. 
Series C No. 158, available at www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_158_ing.doc.
10 The expression is used by F. Sudre, A propos du  “d ia logu e d e  ju g e s ” e t  d u  con tro le d e  con ven tion - 
nalite, Paris 2004.
11 Justice Gilmar Mendes opinion in the Extraordinary Appeal No. 466.343.
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Convention -  becomes clearer when a constitutional provision itself conflicts 
with the Convention12.
It is possible to argue that if the State must comply with the Convention 
and could not invoke its own Constitution to disobey international trea­
ties on human rights this means, as a final concrete result, that the treaty is 
above the Constitution. Thus, the consequence of the conventionality con­
trol would be that the constitutional norm that violates the treaty must not 
be applied. In this sense, it is the constitutional norm itself, and not the 
infraconstitutional statute, that remains “paralyzed”. If, according to the con­
ventionality control, the Constitution cannot validly violate the treaty or the 
Convention, this would be sufficient to display the superiority of the Con­
vention over the Constitution13.
Notice that it is possible to suppose the existence of legislation that is 
unconstitutional, and yet in conformity with the Convention. Sagues makes 
reference to a hypothetical constitutional norm that denies the right of re­
ply, rectification or response, explicitly guaranteed in the Convention (article 
14)14. He argues that a statute that regulate this norm of the Pact would be 
unconstitutional, though conventional. The constitutional norm, by denying 
the right made explicit by the Pact of San Jose, would be unconventional, 
whereas the regulating legislation would be valid -  and not unconstitutional 
or null, “by the superiority of the Pact over the Constitution, according to the 
doctrine of the con ven tiona lity  c o n tr o l ’15.
The question of conventionality control of constitutional norms was de­
bated in the “Last Temptation of Christ” case, in which the Inter-American 
Court declared that Chile would have to reform its Constitution. Here is 
what was said on the occasion: “This Court understands that the interna­
tional responsibility of the State may be engaged by acts or omissions of any 
power or organ of the State, whatsoever its rank, that violate the American 
Convention. That is, any act or omission that may be attributed to the State,
12 Certainly to justify such control by the Convention, it is invoked the p ro  hom in e principle, that 
prioritizes the norm that best protects a right or freedom.
13 N. Pedro Sagues, op. cit., p. 465 e ss.
14 “Article 14. Right of Reply: 1. Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas 
disseminated to the public in general by a legally regulated medium of communication has 
the right to reply or to make a correction using the same communications outlet, under such 
conditions as the law may establish. 2. The correction or reply shall not in any case remit other 
legal liabilities that may have been incurred. 3. For the effective protection of honor and repu­
tation, every publisher, and every newspaper, motion picture, radio, and television company, 
shall have a person responsible who is not protected by immunities or special privileges”.
15 In Spanish: “por la superioridad del Pacto sobre la Constitucion, conforme la doctrina del 
controle de convencionalidad”. Nestor Pedro Sagues, El “control de convencionalidad” en 
particular sobre las constituciones nacionales, La Ley, Doctrina, p. 1, 19.02.2009.
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in violation of the norms of international human rights law engages the inter­
national responsibility of the State. In this case, it was engaged because article 
19(12) of the Constitution establishes prior censorship of cinematographic 
films and, therefore, determines the acts of the Executive, the Legislature and 
the Judiciary. [...] The Court has indicated that the general obligations of the 
State, established in Article 2 of the Convention, include the adoption of 
measures to suppress laws and practices of any kind that imply a violation of 
the guarantees established in the Convention, and also the adoption of laws 
and the implementation of practices leading to the effective observance of the 
said guarantees. [...] In this case, by maintaining cinematographic censorship 
in the Chilean legal system (article 19(12) of the Constitution and Decree 
Law 679), the State is failing to comply with the obligation to adapt its do­
mestic law to the Convention in order to make effective the rights embodied 
in it, as established in Articles 2 and 1(1) of the Convention”.16
5.
As can be seen, national judges have the duty to carry out the conventionality 
control17. Nevertheless, the Inter-American Court also carries out the control 
of internal norms confronting the Pact. According to the Convention, the In­
ter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights are held competent to acknowledge issues related to the fulfill­
16 I/A Court H.R., Case of “The Last Temptation o f  Christ” (O lmedo-Bustos e t  al.) v. Chile. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 5, 2001. Series C No. 73, available at www. 
corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos /articulos/seriec_73_ing.doc) In this case, Judge Augusto Can^ado 
Trindade argued: “If any doubt were still to persist as to this point, i.e., that the very existence 
and applicability of a norm of domestic law (be it infraconstitutional or constitutional) can per 
se engage the responsibility of the State under a human rights treaty, the facts of the present 
case of "The Last Temptation of Christ” contribute, in my view decisively, to dissipate such 
doubt. From the facts in this case of "The Last Temptation of Christ" it is rather inferred that, 
in circumstances such as those of the cas d'espece, the attempt to distinguish between the 
existence and the effective application of a norm of domestic law, for the purpose of determin­
ing the configuration or otherwise of the international responsibility of the State, becomes 
irrelevant, and discloses an extremely formalist outlook of Law, devoid of any sense. [ ...] the 
Court correctly determines that, in the circumstances of the cas d'espece, the modifications in 
the domestic legal order required to harmonize this latter with the norms of protection of the 
American Convention constitute a form of non-pecuniary reparation under the Convention”. 
See Judge Augusto Can^ado Trindade concurring opinion I/A Court H.R., Case of “The Last 
Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile. available at: www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/ 
casos/votos/vsc_cancado_73_ing.doc.
17 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights used the expression conventionality control for 
the first time at the trial of M yrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala Case. Merits, Reparations and 
Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2003. Series C No. 101, available at: www.corteidh.or.cr/ 
docs/casos/articulos/seriec_101_ing.doc.
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ment of the commitments made by the States Parties to the Convention (article 
33). The Commission holds the function, among others, to act when petitions 
and communications are presented to it, in conformity with articles 44 to 51 
of the Convention. Article 44 establishes that any one person or group, or 
legally recognized non-governmental entity in one or more member States of 
the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing de­
nunciations or complaints of violation of the Convention by a signatory State 
Party. Except emergencies18, the Commission, by recognizing the admissibility 
of the petition or communication of violation of rights, will request informa­
tion to the Government of the State to which the accused authority responsible 
for the violation serves. On receiving the data or after the expired deadline 
without manifestation, the Commission will verify whether the grounds for 
the petition or communication still exist, being able to determine its filing, 
inadmissibility or dismissal. If it is not the case, the Commission will carry out 
the examination of the facts, the parties being awere of it It may request the 
interested State for any relevant information, placing itself at the disposal of the 
interested parties so as to reach an amicable solution (article 48). In the absence 
of a consensual solution, the Commission will issue a report in which facts and 
conclusions are displayed, adding to it the verbal or written exposures made by 
the interested parties. In its report, the Commission could formulate proposi­
tions and recommendations that judges adequate (article 50). If within three 
months the matter is not resolved or submitted to the decision of the Court by 
the Commission or by the interested State, the Commission may issue, by the 
absolute majority of the votes of its members, its opinion and conclusions on 
the matter ubmitted matter to its analysis. The Commission will make relevant 
recommendations and will set a deadline within which the State must take 
incumbent measures in order to remedy the examined situation. Expired the 
deadline, the Commission will decide, by the absolute majority of the votes 
of its members, whether the State has taken or not the adequate measures and 
whether it publishes or not its reports (article 51).
In the meanwhile, the Inter-American Court may only be provoked by 
the States Parties and by the Commission itself and, besides this, it may only 
know of any case after having elapsed the preliminary phase of admissibility, 
the instruction of the case and the attempt of amicable solution before the 
Commission, with the dispatch of its report according to article 50 of the 
Convention.
18 Article 48: “2. However, in serious and urgent cases, only the presentation of a petition or com­
munication that fulfills all the formal requirements of admissibility shall be necessary in order 
for the Commission to conduct an investigation with the prior consent of the state in whose 
territory a violation has allegedly been committed”.
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The Court has the understanding, at first, that it could only carry out 
control on the norm already submitted to a determined case. It claimed to 
not have competence to carry out control in abstract, associating this with an 
advisory role. Accordingly, the Court decided: “W ith regard to the Govern­
ment's failure to comply with Article 2 of the American Convention with 
the application of Decrees 591 and 600, this Court found that the military 
courts did not p e r  se  violate the Convention (supra 84), and regarding the 
alleged application of some of the provisions of those decrees that could con­
travene the Convention, it has already been determined that they were not 
enforced in the instant Case (supra 72). Consequently, the Court does not 
express an opinion on the compatibility of these articles with the Conven­
tion; to act otherwise would be to make an abstract analysis, which lies out­
side the purview of this Court”1 9 .
This understanding was overcome in the Suarez Rosero v. Equador case, 
in which the Court acknowledged its competence to declare the unconven­
tionality of a norm that had violated the article 2 of the Convention, de­
spite the fact that such norm has not been applied in a concrete case or has 
caused any damage. The decision has the following basis: “As the Court has 
maintained, the States Parties to the Convention may not order measures 
that violate the rights and freedoms recognized therein [...]. Whereas the first 
two provisions of Article 114 bis of the Ecuadorian Criminal Code accord 
detained persons the right to be released when the conditions indicated exist, 
the last paragraph of the same article contains an exception to that law. The 
Court considers that this exception deprives a part of the prison population 
of a fundamental right, on the basis of the crime of which it is accused and, 
hence, intrinsically injures everyone in that category. This rule has been ap­
plied in the specific case of Mr. Suarez-Rosero and has caused him undue 
harm. The Court further observes that, in its opinion, this law violates per se
Article 2 of the American Convention, whether or not it was enforced in the
» 20instant case”2 0 .
19 I/A Court H.R., Case of Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment 
of January 29, 1997. Series C No. 30, available at www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ 
seriec_30_ing.doc.
20 I/A Court H.R., Case of Suarez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of November 12, 1997. 
Series C No. 35, available at www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_35_ing.doc. 
Worth noting that this argument already has been sustained by Judge Antonio Augusto Can- 
^ado Trindade in previous cases by dissenting votes, in which he has argued that violation 
of conventional norms can happen per se, by the mere existence of internal norms violating 
conventional human rights’ standards, despite the fact they have never been enforced, i.e.: 
I/A Court H.R., Case of Caballero Delgado and Santana v. Colombia. Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of January 29, 1997. Series C No. 31.
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To illustrate the performance of both the Commission and the Court in 
the control of conventionality of internal legislation is timely to consider the 
“Barrios Altos” case. In Peru, a statute gave amnesty to the military, police 
officials and civilians who had violated human rights. This legislation was 
enacted after a complaint against people of a paramilitary group -  called 
“Grupo Colina”, who had assassinated fifteen people in the place named 
“Bairros Altos”, in Lima. The judge who had received the complaint decided 
that article 1 of the Amnesty Law violated constitutional guarantees and obli­
gations of the State before the Inter-American System. After a few procedural 
issues, a new legislation was passed on, that declared that the first law would 
not be able to be an object of review by the Judiciary. On 14th July 1995, the 
Supreme Court of Justice of Lima decided to definitely close the case. Thus, 
the “Barrios Altos” case was taken, through petition, to the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights, where it was conducted from 1995 to 2000, 
when it was submitted to the Court. The Commission requested that the 
Court, in addition to the pertaining arrangements to the continuity of the 
investigation and to the remedy of damages, to repeal or make the amnesty 
law void. In his vote, the Brazilian Judge Can^ado Trindade affirmed that 
the auto-amnesty laws are incompatible with the International Law of Hu­
man Rights, therefore regarding them as deprived of validity on the level of 
International Law of Human Rights. The Court concluded that the Amnesty 
Law was incompatible with the Convention -  since the legislation excluded 
the liability and allowed the prevented the investigation and punishment of 
people responsible for violations of human rights -, culminating in the deci­
sion of its “unconventionality”, declaring the non-application of the internal 
norm with erga om nes effect for all public authorities21.
The non-compliance with the Inter-American Court decision generates 
international liability for the State. Nevertheless, some States still do not 
comply with decisions of the Court, as exemplified in the recent decision 
of the Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela, which simply declared to be 
unenforceable sentence of the Lopez M endoza v. Venezuela22 case. In this trial, 
the Court determined the repeal of the resolutions that revoked the political 
rights of Lopez Mendoza, opponent of Hugo Chavez in the presidential elec­
tions of 2012, considering the Venezuelan State responsible for the violation 
of the of defense and to motivated reasons in the administrative procedures 
that resulted in the sanctions of disqualification, as well responsible for the
21 I/A Court H.R., Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru. Merits. Judgment March 14, 2001. Series C 
No. 75.
22 I/A Court H.R., Case of Lopez Mendoza v. Venezuela. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judg­
ment of September 1, 2011. Series C No. 233.
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violation of the rights to judicial protection and to be elected, all guaranteed 
in the Convention.
Therefore, the question that naturally emerges is the one of the legiti­
macy of the Inter-American Court to interfere on decisions of the States. The 
problem of democratic legitimacy deficit of the judges is even more severe in 
the transnational justice scenario. Note that, if the autonomy of the human 
rights bears importance for the consolidation of a State under rule of law, it 
also interferes in the ordinary proceedings of collective self-determination. In 
this vein, Owen Fiss argues that the consensual element inherent to the pro­
ceeding of elaboration of the treaties does not offer the international courts 
a democratic basis. The internal proceedings of ratification of a treaty are not 
necessarily democratic. Would the ratification of a treaty by China represent 
an act of consent among its citizens? Even in the United States the ratification 
of treaties lies in the hands of the Senate, which is not constituted according 
to the democratic principles, being therefore the form of consent peculiar to 
this Legislative House inadequate according to democratic politics23. As a re­
sult, Fiss goes on, the international courts recently set to protect the human 
rights remain without accountability to the citizens of the world organized 
according to democratic principles and, thus, must be seen as a great loss for 
democracy, though important for justice24.
Worth of consideration are the Court’s pronouncements that can affect 
the self-determination of the State Party's people, as has occurred in the “Gel­
man v. Uruguai”25 case, in which the validity of the Uruguayan Amnesty Law 
(lei de caducidad) was denied, even though legitimated, through direct par­
ticipation, on two occasions. The Court stated that “the fact that the Expiry 
Law of the State has been approved in a democratic regime and yet ratified or 
supported by the public, on two occasions, namely, through the exercise of 
direct democracy, does not automatically or by itself grant legitimacy under 
International Law. The participation of the public in relation with the law, 
using methods of direct exercise of democracy, referendum (paragraph 2 of
23 O. Fiss, The A utonomy o f  Law, “Yale Journal of International Law” 2001, v. 26, p. 517 e ss.
24 Ib id em , p. 524 e ss.
25 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights presented, pursuant to Articles 51 and 61 
of the Convention, an application against the Republic of Uruguay in relation to the enforced 
disappearance of Marfa Claudia Garcia Iruretagoyena de Gelman since late 1976, and the 
the suppression of identity and nationality of Marfa Macarena Gelman Garcia Iruretagoyena, 
daughter of Marfa Claudia Garcia de Gelman and Marcelo Gelman. It was alleged the denial 
of justice, impunity, and in general, the suffering caused to Juan Gelman, his family, Marfa 
Macarena Gelman, and the next of kin of Marfa Claudia Garcia, as a consequence of the fail­
ure to investigate the facts, prosecute, and punish those responsible under Law No. 15.848 or 
the Expiry Law (hereinafter "the Expiry Law”), promulgated in 1986.
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Article 79 of the Constitution of Uruguay) in 1989 and “plebiscite (letter 
A of Article 331 of the Constitution of Uruguay) regarding a referendum that 
declared as null Articles 1 and 4 of the Law -  therefore, October 25, 2009, 
should be considered, as an act attributable to the State that give rise to its 
international responsibility. The bare existence of a democratic regime does 
not guarantee, per se, the permanent respect of International Law, including 
International Law of Human Rights, and which has also been considered 
by the Inter-American Democratic Charter. [...] the protection of human 
rights constitutes an impassable limit to the rule of the majority, that is, to 
the forum of the “possible to be decided” by the majorities in the democratic 
instance, those who should also prioritize “control of conformity with the 
Convention”.26
The acts committed by military dictatorships against human rights are 
reprehensible and worthy of severe condemnation. It is a matter of obvious­
ness. The problem is that the Court, without questioning the democratic 
quality of the forms of direct participation that set the basis for the Uru­
guayan law, claimed them to be insufficient to legitimize the legislation under 
the International Law. The Court, in order to decide, simply stated that "the 
protection of human rights constitutes an impassable limit to the rule of 
the majority". It was argued that the unconventionality of the Amnesty Law 
does not comes from the illegibility of the proceeding that made it emerge or 
from the authority that enected it, but from the circumstance of leaving the 
acts of human rights’ violation unpunished. The unconventionality, stated 
the Court, results from a material aspect, and not from a “formal matter, as 
its source”.
The idea that the direct popular participation constitutes a “formal mat­
ter”, without any importance -  under the undeniable indispensability of hu­
man rights protection -, requires meditation27. Human rights are not incom­
patible with democracy28. Both coexist and, that is why, this relation must 
be mediated by a democratic interpretation29. The Court is not dispensed 
from legitimizing its decisions, opposing human rights with the majority of 
a country’s will. Facing this question, it will have to show when it is not 
possible to deliberate and, especially, when a majority decision, though for­
26 I/A Court H.R., Case Gelman v. Uruguay. Merits and Reparations. Judgment of February 24, 
2011 Series C No. 221, available at www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_221_ing. 
doc.
27 C. Santiago Nino, La constitu icion  d e la dem ocracia  deliberativa, Barcelona 1997, p. 21 e ss.
28 C. Santiago Nino, E tica y  derechos humanos, Buenos Aires 1989, p. 32 e ss.
29 C. F. Zurn, D eliberative D em ocracy a n d  the Institutions o f  Ju d ic ia l R eview. New York 2007, 
p. 89 e ss.
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mally taken, does not express the true will of a people, for beeing elaborated 
without adequate discussion or with real or virtual exclusion of part of the 
population30. Thus, it would be up to the Court to show, in a rational man­
ner, that either the will of the people is incompatible with the extinction of 
punishment for crimes against human rights or the majority decision lacks 
democratic basis.
Thus, the demonstration of incompatibility between democracy and 
human rights is not simply done with a rethorical phrase, in which what 
must be shown is simply affirmed. To say that the will of the majority is not 
compatible with human rights means nothing. Demonstration is needed by 
rational arguments -  that in certain cases human rights are irreconcilable 
with democracy31. Is not being said that the extinction of punishment is ir­
reconcilable -  because that is not the aspect of the decision that matters here, 
but that the Court failed to legitimize its decision, making the reasons for 
that conclusion clear. The point, as previously stated, does not concern the 
perverse essence of the acts committed by military dictatorships, but the mat­
ter of legitimacy of a Court, composed by men of remarkable knowledge, to 
negate the legitimacy of a majority decision without consideration as to the 
democratic quality, to express the will of a people.
6 .
As previously seen, the Inter-American Court understands that the con­
ventionality control is not restricted to the infraconstitutional norms, fall­
ing upon all the internal law, in which the constitutional norms are set. In 
these terms, any internal normative act, be it infraconstitutional -  statute, 
ordinance, regulation, resolution - or of constitutional nature, are subject to 
conventionality control by the Court.
In the meantime, also according to the Inter-American Court, the norma­
tive material of control, the so called “conventionality block”32, is integrated 
by the Convention, by other human rights treaties or conventions under 
responsibility of the Court, as well as its precedents.33
30 R. Gargarella, La ju s tic ia  fr en te  a l  gob iern o  (sobre e l  cardcter contram ayoritario d e l  p o d e r  ju d icia l) , 
Barcelona 1996, p. 33 e ss.
31 C. Santiago Nino, E tica y  derechos humanos..., p. 55 e ss.
32 Humberto Nogueira Alcala, Dignidad de la persona, derechos fundamentales y  bloque cons- 
titucional de derechos: una aproximacion desde Chile y  America Latina, Revista d e  D erecho 
(U niversidad Catdlica d e l  Uruguay), n. 10, p. 131 e ss.
33 In the Gomez Palom ino v. Peru case, the Inter-American Court has carried out conventionality 
control based on a distinct international instrument to the American Convention on Human 
Rights, adopting the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons as con­
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The decision of the Court determines the modification of the judicial order 
of the State Party, in order to make it compatible with the American Conven­
tion. The decision of unconventionality is mandatory to the State Party, in 
the terms of articles 62.3 e 68.1 of the Convention, imposing it the reform 
of its legislation or even its Constitution, as occurred in the “Last Tempta­
tion of Christ” and “Caesar v. Trinidad y Tobago” cases. The non-compliance 
with Court’s decisions generates international liability (articles 1.1 and 2 of 
the Convention).
Therefore, the decision of the Court does not annul or derogate the in­
ternal norms by itself. However, in cases regarding crimes against humanity, 
the Court has declared to the non-application of the internal norms with erga  
om nes effects for all the public authorities. This is what occurred in the Bar­
rios Altos34, Constitutional Court of Peru35 and La Cantuta36 cases.
On the other hand, the Inter-American Court has been claiming mandatory 
force for its precedents37, that is, the binding effect of the reasons of its decisions. 
In 2004, in judging “Tibi v. Ecuador”, the Court warned that “an international 
human rights court does not have the aspiration -  and has it even less so than the 
national body -  of solving a large number of contentious cases that reproduce vi­
olations previously brought before it, and on whose essential themes it has already 
issued judgments that express its criterion as the natural interpreter of the legal 
standards that it has the responsibility of applying, that is, the provisions of the 
international treaty invoked by the litigants. This design, which clearly expresses 
a function of the Court, also suggests the characteristics that matters brought 
before it may have”38. In 2006, in the “Almonacid Arellano and others v. Chile”
trol parameter. I/A Court H.R., Case of Gomez Palomino v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and 
Costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 136, available at: www.corteidh.or.cr/ 
docs/casos/articulos/seriec_136_ing.doc.
34 I/A Court H.R., Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru. Merits. Judgment March 14, 2001. Series C No. 
75, available at www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_75_ing.doc.
35 I/A Court H.R., Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No. 71, available at www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/ 
articulos/seriec_71_ing.doc.
36 I/A Court H.R., Case of La Cantuta v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 
November 29, 2006. Series C No. 162, available at www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ 
seriec_162_ing.doc.
37 See: L.G. Marinoni, Curso d eD ireito  Constitucional. 2nd. ed. Sao Paulo 2013, p. 1274 e ss; L.G. 
Marinoni, Precedentes Obrigatorios. 3rd. ed. Sao Paulo 2013.
38 I/A Court H.R., Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, available at www.corteidh.or.cr/ 
docs/casos/articulos/seriec_114_ing.doc.
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case, the Inter-American Court stressed again the mandatory force of its decisions 
reminding that, when a State ratifies a treaty, its judges are also submitted to it, so 
“this forces them to see that all the effects of the provisions embodied in the Con­
vention are not adversely affected by the enforcement of laws which are contrary 
to its purpose and that have not had any legal effects since their inception. [...] To 
perform this task, the Judiciary has to take into account not only the treaty, but 
also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court, which is the 
ultimate interpreter of the American Convention”39.
The Argentinian Supreme Court, in the Mazzeo case, in acknowledging 
the legitimacy of the conventionality control, stated that “when a State has 
ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges 
are also submitted to it, which demands them to ensure that the useful effect 
of the Convention is not diminished or invalidated by the application of legis­
lation contrary to its provisions, object and purpose, and from the beginning 
lacking juridical effects. In other words, the juridical authorities must carry 
out a sort of conventionality control within the internal norms that apply to 
the concrete cases and to the American Convention on Human Rights”40. In 
this case, in addition to admitting the necessity of the conventionality con­
trol, the Argentine Supreme Court claimed to be submitted to the interpreta­
tion given to the conventional law by the Inter-American Court. This means 
that the Court kept it clear that, in carrying out the conventionality control, 
the direction granted to the Convention by the Inter-American Court must 
be observed: “Therefore, the Supreme Court of Argentina applies the guide­
lines of interpretation according to the American Convention as a minimum 
standard of respect of human rights, as well as the respect and safeguard of 
the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”41.
39 I/A Court H.R., Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, available at www. 
corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_154_ing.doc
40 In Spanish: “cuando un Estado ha ratificado un tratado internacional como la Convencion 
Americana, sus jueces, como parte del aparato del Estado, tambien estan sometidos a ella, 
lo que les obliga a velar porque los efectos de las disposiciones de la Convencion no se vean 
mermadas por la aplicacion de leyes contrarias a su objeto y  fin, y que desde un inicio carecen 
de efectos jurfdicos. En otras palabras, el Poder Judicial, debe ejercer una especie de ‘control 
de convencionalidad’ entre las normas jurfdicas internas que aplican en los casos concretos y  la 
Convencion Americana sobre Derechos Humanos”. Argentine Supreme Court, Mazzeo, Julio 
Lilo et al; appeal in cassation and unconstitutionality control, M 2333.XLII, 13.07.2007.
41 In Spanish: “Asf, a Corte Suprema de Argentina aplica la pauta de interpretacion que del 
mismo ha hecho la Corte interamericana, interpretacion conforme a la Convencion Ame­
ricana como estandar mfnimo de respeto de derechos humanos, como asi mismo el respeto 
y resguardo de la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos”. Argenti­
ne Supreme Court, Mazzeo, Julio Lilo et al; appeal in cassation and unconstitutionality con­
trol, M 2333.XLII, 13.07.2007.
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The Constitutional Court of Bolivia has also declared its binding to the 
precedents of the Inter-American Court: “Compliance with these requirements 
that constitute natural justice, ensures the correct determination of rights and 
obligations of persons, hence the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
whose ju risp rud en ce is b ind ing to in ternal ju risd iction , in its judgement of Janu­
ary 31, 2001 (Case of the Constitutional Court, 77 paragraph) has established 
that any person subject to any trial vedore any organ of the State must have the 
assurance that this organ is competent, independent, and impartial”42.
Although the matter has not been properly examined by the Inter-Ameri­
can Court and by the national courts, it is understood, from previous decisions, 
that there is an attempt to assign binding effect to the ratio decid end i or the 
reasons of the decisions, in such a way as to force the national courts to adopt 
the meaning assigned to the conventional norm by the Inter-American Court.
It would be possible to argue that the Convention says that only the States 
Parties “undertake to comply with the decisions of the Court in every  case 
in w h ich  it  takes p a r t” (article 68), which would mean solely obligation to 
respect the decisions taken in proceedings in which the State has participated 
as a party, something like res ju d ica ta  or cla im  preclu sion  in order to prevent 
the denial of the decision and the review of the case.
Nevertheless, the obligation to respect the reasons of a decision has 
nothing to do with the participation as a party in a proceeding in which it 
emerged. The party, obviously, is subject to the operative part of the decision, 
unable to withdrawal. What follows is that the reasons or ratio d e cid en d i ex­
press a juridical thesis or the meaning given to a norm according to a certain 
factual reality. This thesis or meaning, by revealing the understanding of the 
Court on how the Convention must be comprehended in certain situations, 
must certainly be observed by all those obliged to the Convention.
It is evident that, the binding effect of the reasons of Court's decisions 
only reinforces its authority, strengthening the precepts of the Convention. 
In such a way that the true problem lies in the necessity to elaborate and use 
of a dogmatic that allows an adequate operation with precedents, avoiding its 
equivocal perpetuation, as well as their misguided application to substantially 
distinct cases.
42 In Spanish: “El cumplimiento de estos requisitos que hacen al Juez natural, permite garantizar 
la correcta determinacion de los derechos y  obligaciones de las personas; de ahf que la Corte 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, cuya jurisprudencia es vinculante para la jurisdiccion 
interna, en su Sentencia de 31 de enero de 2001 (Caso Tribunal Constitucional de Peru, parra- 
fo 77), ha estabelecido que toda persona sujeta a juicio de cualquier naturaleza ante un organo 
del Estado debera contar con la garantia de que dicho organo sea competente, independiente 
e imparcial”. Constitutional Court of Bolivia, Sentencia 0664/2004-R, 06.05.2004.
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Nonetheless, following the understanding of the Brazilian Supreme Court 
that confers supralegal law nature to the conventional norms, the conven­
tional precedent contrary to the constitutional norm does not detain author­
ity over the Brazilian Judiciary power.
The d istin gu ish in g  technique, which allows the distinction of the case un­
der trial for the non-adoption of precedent, has an application quite more 
difficult than the concrete particularities that involve the case to be judged. 
As commonly known, allegation has been made that the theory of the bind­
ing precedents might hinder not only the development of the law, but also its 
adequacy to the different social facts and values. Such an allegation is obvi­
ously unfounded, once a theory of precedents cannot disregard the reasons 
which demand the repeal of the precedent and the reasons that prevent the 
application of a precedent to a certain concrete case. This means that the 
modification of the social facts and values, as well as the alteration of the gen­
eral conception about the law, lead to the repeal of the precedent, in the same 
way that they may bring about another precedent in addition to one that 
already exists. In other words, to regulate the submitted case to oth er circum­
stances and social values requires anoth er precedent. Basically, the problem is 
not the repea l of the precedent and in the elaboration of a new  one, but in the 
preserva tion  of precedent and the edition of another. The distinction is subtle 
but holds great practical and theoretical relevance. It shows that, for the de­
velopment of the law, the sole repeal of the precedent is insufficient, being 
indispensable, when facing equally va lid  facts and values, the elaboration of 
anoth er  precedent for the regulation of the law.
Therefore, the application of binding precedents in a supranational di­
mension is much more complicated than in the scope of internal law. On 
the supranational level, there are notable differences between the political 
contingencies and the social realities of each country, many times raising the 
impossibility to define an equally legitimate regulation for them all. In a way 
that the application of the distin gu ish in g  technique, in the dimension of con­
ventional law, is particularly made legitimate by the difference between the 
realities of each country, which makes its adoption -  in the perspective of the 
difference between the social realities and values -  more frequent than in the 
scope of internal jurisdictions.
It is interesting to note that the same way the Inter-American Court's deci­
sions have a difficult relation with the ordinary proceedings of collective self­
determination, the application of binding precedents requires much more cau­
tion under conventionality control than under constitutionality control.
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Abstrakt
Artykuł omawia decyzję brazylijskiego Sądu Najwyższego w sprawie hierarchii 
międzynarodowych traktatów dotyczących praw człowieka w prawie brazylijskim. 
Wyjaśniono nadrzędność tychże traktatów i sposób działania kontroli zgodności prawnej 
w prawie brazylijskim. Przedstawiono również teorie kontroli nadkonstytucyjności 
i zgodności prawnej autorstwa Międzyamerykańskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka oraz 
uwagi dotyczące przedmiotu i parametrów narzędzia conventionality control w  Sądzie 
Międzyamerykańskim. Zinterpretowano i omówiono precedensy dotyczące kontroli 
zgodności prawnej.
Słowa kluczowe: Amerykańska Konwencja Praw Człowieka, conventionality control, 
prawo brazylijskie
